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GAMBLING AND RISKY CHOICE 
 
John C. Borrero 
University of Maryland, Baltimore County 
____________________ 
 
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino bring a very 
rich understanding of basic research with hu-
mans and nonhumans to bear on what may be 
considered a gambling pandemic. As the well-
researched random ratio schedule may charac-
terize “gambling” by nonhumans (e.g., Mad-
den, Ewan, & Lagorio, 2007), the slot ma-
chine or similar games of chance characterize 
gambling by humans. By walking the reader 
through the enormous body of literature that 
relates to probabilistic and delayed outcomes 
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino draw the reader’s 
attention to several findings that suggest that 
humans should not be problem gamblers (e.g., 
experimental evidence that illustrates that 
money is discounted less steeply than other 
goods and the essentially human characteristic 
of risk aversion). The authors then go on to 
suggest additional environmental circums-
tances that illustrate why we should expect 
problem gambling (the authors place consi-
derable and appropriate weight on the gam-
bling context and the potential differential 
sensitivity of a particular organism’s beha-
vior; a strictly idiographic account and one 
that should evoke no objections from the most 
radical of behavior analysts, nor the most log-
ical psychologist, psychiatrist, or economist). 
Dixon, Jacobs, and Sanders (2006) recently 
addressed the role played by context (a gam-
bling environment as compared to non-
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gambling environments) and found that pa-
thological gamblers’ level of discounting was 
altered by the context in which the discount-
ing tasks were completed. More to the point, 
the gambling environment appeared to have 
evoked greater discounting as compared to 
the non-gambling environment for many of 
the participants. What this seems to suggest is 
that the extent to which one discounts delayed 
(or probabilistic) events is a function of pre-
vailing environmental contingencies, the indi-
vidual’s specific history with similar envi-
ronmental contingencies, and very important-
ly, the commodity under consideration (e.g., 
money vs. events that have direct metabolic 
function, as the authors suggest). Again, a 
suggestion that should evoke no objection. 
In reading this exceptional discussion 
piece I found myself pondering two ques-
tions: (a) What is gambling? and (b) How 
might a behavioral approach to gambling deal 
with outcomes that are not easily quantifia-




BLING, AND PATHOLOGICAL 
GAMBLING 
The task of defining gambling should be 
rather simple, and on the surface it is probably 
well understood by those who read this jour-
nal. Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino frequently 
used the terms “pathological gambling” and 
“problem gambling” to describe the topic at 
hand (i.e., gambling). Pathological gambling 
is a formal psychological disorder (under the 
category of “impulse-control disorders not 
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elsewhere classified”) and may be diagnosed 
when a person meets 5 or more of the 10 di-
agnostic criteria for the disorder (DSM IV, 
1994; Petry & Armentano, 1999). Problem 
gambling falls short of pathological gambling, 
but is exemplified by behavioral symptoms of 
pathological gambling (Weatherly & Dixon, 
2007). Clearly, these are persons in need of 
assessment and intervention, and presumably 
this strengthens our conceptualization of 
gambling. From my reading, gambling con-
notes undesirable behavior. Clearly in the 
case of pathological or problem gambling un-
desirable behavior is denoted and not con-
noted. If we simply take the term gambling 
however, we might conceptualize it as active-
ly choosing to risk losing one reinforcer to 
obtain a highly preferred reinforcer with a 
probability less than 1.0 (G. Madden, Febru-
ary 8, 2009, personal communication). If the 
reader finds this to be an acceptable definition 
of gambling, then one might ask, is gambling 
bad? My sense is that gambling (just gam-
bling) is not “bad” and in some situations it 
may be “good.” For example, in an educa-
tional context, a young student may be faced 
with a situation in which she can earn a lower 
quality reinforcer for completing mastery lev-
el tasks (those that she can complete accurate-
ly and fluently) or earn a higher quality rein-
forcer for completing more challenging ma-
terial. By choosing the mastery level task we 
may conclude that the student has not gam-
bled (the probability of reinforcement for 
completing the “easy” tasks is 1.0). By choos-
ing the challenging task the student must fo-
rego a sure thing (the reinforcers, albeit less 
preferred reinforcers, available from the mas-
tery level tasks) for the chance to obtain a 
highly preferred reinforcer with a probability 
of less than 1.0 (since the task is more diffi-
cult and she will likely emit some incorrect 
responding thereby resulting in less overall 
reinforcers). From a strictly pragmatic pers-
pective, an educator or parent would likely 
encourage the “gamble” in this scenario 
guided by the assumption that bringing the 
student into contact with such learning oppor-
tunities will impact the acquisition of new 
skills. This example too fits with the frame-
work constructed by Fantino and Stolarz-
Fantino regarding why we should expect 
gambling (e.g., the context in which choices 
are made) and should not expect gambling 
(e.g., humans are risk averse), and is also con-
sistent with the authors’ reference to work by 
Holt, Green, and Myerson (2003) who sug-
gest that impulsivity is not a central trait that 
defines risk taking and hypersensitivity to de-
layed events. Like the conditions that do or do 
not support pathological gambling, the condi-
tions that support risky choice (when the out-
come for doing so is the edification of the or-
ganism) should also be considered. 
 
QUANTIFYING DIFFICULT TO 
QUANTIFY OUTCOMES 
For behavior analysts to conduct evalua-
tions of (monetary) gambling is by no means 
an easy endeavor, and one for which behavior 
analysts have particular skill (e.g., concep-
tually and methodologically). It is challenging 
for several reasons, and one particularly com-
plex variable suggested by Weatherly and Di-
xon (2007) is human verbal behavior. Again, I 
recognize and agree that monetary problem 
and pathological gambling are in dire need of 
sound behavioral research. The discounting 
(delay or probability) procedures described by 
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino have resulted in 
very useful metrics to characterize the value 
of delayed monetary events. However, as the 
authors note, the outcomes of pathological 
gambling are sometimes difficult to quantify. 
For example, we can easily point to the finan-
cial losses incurred by the problem gambler, 
but how does one quantify marital dysfunc-
tion that contributes to divorce? Without a 
monetary conversion of the outcome, how 
does one characterize the (real) costs of pa-
thological gambling? Odum, Baumann, and 
Rimington (2006) and Bickel, Odum, and 
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Madden (1999) take us closer to a better un-
derstanding of how this might be accom-
plished. Odum et al. pitted amounts of food 
against monetary rewards and Bickel et al. 
pitted delayed cigarettes against delayed 
money, both in traditional discounting prepa-
rations. While both food and cigarettes may 
also be converted to monetary amounts, the 
value of cigarettes, for example, is likely 
more than its simple monetary conversion. 
The observation here is that gambling (in the 
broader use of the term) is associated with a 
number of possible outcomes that may pose 
challenges for behavioral researchers driven 
so strongly by a method of quantification. But 
we should not give up. Sexual promiscuity 
may be one such example of gambling. The 
“gamble” in this situation might involve for-
going a “safe” encounter with a long-term 
partner while actively choosing to engage a 
stranger. Although the reinforcing value of 
the interaction with a stranger may be excee-
dingly high at the 0-s delay marker (imme-
diate reward), the potential outcomes of the 
choice may be considerable (e.g., a sexually 
transmitted disease, a disrupted relationship 
with the long-term partner) but more difficult 
to tag with a number.  
It would be foolish to presume that the 
two observations put forth in this commentary 
represent the “next steps” in the evaluation of 
gambling (broadly defined). It is clear that 
there are other more pressing matters to ad-
dress first. However, Fantino and Stolarz-
Fantino have reminded me that there are also 
other complicated matters that behavior ana-
lysts will likely need to address to construct a 
comprehensive approach to risky choice and 
pathological gambling. By establishing and 
fostering relationships with colleagues 
beyond the choir (behavior analysts) we may 
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I thank my graduate students for their stimulating dis-
cussion of the work by Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino and 
for assisting me in formulating my commentary.  
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